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Abstract
We investigate and compare different approaches to derive strategies from laboratory
data in prisoners’ dilemmas experiments. While theory suggests more cooperation
in spatial structures than in spaceless ones, we find in our experiments either the
opposite or no difference. In this paper we investigate to which degree learning and
reinforcement explains this dependence on structure and information. Starting from
a very simple model we gradually develop a setup where players use repeated game
strategies and choose among these strategies using a simple reinforcement rule. We
then measure to which degree this model explain players’ behaviour.
JEL-Classification: C72, C92, D74, D83, H41, R12
Keywords: Local interaction, experiments, prisoner’s dilemma, reinforcement, re-
peated games.
1 Introduction
In this paper we investigate experimentally a prisoners’ dilemma situation in a spatial and
a spaceless model. Theoretically spatial prisoners’ dilemmas have been studied by Axel-
rod [Axe84], Bonnhoeffer, Nowak and May [BMN93], Ellison [Ell93], Eshel, Samuelson,
and Shaked [ESS98], Kirchkamp [Kir99], Lindgren and Nordahl [LN94], Nowak and May
[NM92, NM93], Hegselmann [Heg94], Ely [Ely96] and several others. A brief discussion
can be found in Kirchkamp and Nagel [KN00].
A large part of this literature assumes learning rules of the type “switch if better” that
operate on the level of stage game strategies1. A smaller part of the literature studies
repeated game strategies, again with “switch if better”2. In the experimental literature
∗We would like to express our thanks to the German DFG (through SFB 303 and SFB 504) and the
Spanish DGIC Te´cnica PB98-1076 for supporting the project. Main ideas for this paper where conceived
while the first author stayed at the Universita¨t Bielefeld’s ZiF with the research group “Making Choices”.
We thank Werner Gu¨th and other members of this group for helpful comments.
†University of Mannheim, SFB 504; L 13, 15; D-68131 Mannheim, email: oliver@kirchkamp.de.
‡Dep.of Economics, Universitat Pompeu Fabra; Ramon Trias Fargas, 24; E-08005 Barcelona, email:
rosemarie.nagel@econ.upf.es.
1See [BMN93, Ell93, ESS98, NM92, NM93].
2See [Axe84, Kir99, LN94, Heg94].
2only spaceless structures3 are analysed with the help of repeated game strategies. Exper-
imental studies of spatial situations4 restrict their analysis to only stage game strategies.
In the current paper we compare spatial with non-spatial behaviour, allowing for repeated
game strategies.
Theoretically, “switch if better” is a compelling rule. Players compare past average
payoffs of their own and of other visible players for available strategies and choose the
most successful strategy for the next period.
In prisoners’ dilemmas without spatial structure this behaviour eliminates cooperation.
If everybody plays against everybody else, defection is always the most successful strategy,
and will, hence, be imitated by all players.
With a spatial structure, however, cooperative behaviour may survive if players follow
a “switch if better” rule. Clusters of cooperative players obtain higher payoffs than
clusters of non cooperative players. Since successful clusters of cooperative players are in
particular visible in the vicinity of these clusters, clusters may even grow at their borders,
and, since cooperation grows predominantly at the borders of cooperative clusters, clusters
can remain intact and successful.
Experimentally, however, this compelling theoretical property can not be replicated.
Figure 1 shows for illustration the frequences of cooperation in different conditions (spatial
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Figure 1: Frequency of cooperative actions per player
structure, information) that we are going to describe in detail in section 2. At this stage
it is sufficient to know that “groups” have no spatial structure wheras “circles” have one.
In contrast to the the theoretical prediction we find more cooperation (and not less) in
the spaceless structure (group) than in the spatial one (circle), at least in the “info”
condition. We find roughly the same amount of cooperation in the “no info” condition.
In neither case can we replicate the theoretical prediction that is based on the “switch if
better rule”.
3See [SMU97] and [Axe84].
4See [KEB97, KEB98, KN00].
3Kirchkamp and Nagel [KN00] give a first explanation for this phenomenon. They
assume that players use only stage game strategies and that learning rules are based on
past payoffs. Under this condition they estimate parameters of possible learning rules
and find that players base their choice only on their own payoff experience and neglect
observed payoffs from neighbours.
In the current paper we extend this analysis to simple repeated game strategies of
the following type: Cooperate if the difference between the observed payoffs between
cooperation and non-cooperation is larger than a certain threshold. The threshold may be
different for each player and may or may not change over time. This approach contains as a
special case the “switch if better” rule that is used throughout the theoretical literature.5
We then measure to which degree the behaviour of players in our experiment can be
explained as governed by repeated game strategies that were successful in the past, and
to which degree players rely on comparison of stage game payoffs.
We will describe the experimental setup in section 2. We then introduce repeated game
strategies to allow players to condition on past behaviour of their opponents. We start
with a simple version with constant repeated game strategies for each player in section 3.
We introduce a more elaborate model in section 4 where repeated game strategies may
change over time. We relate changes in repeated game strategies to payoffs using a simple
reinforcement approach in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 The experimental setup
In the following we outline our experimental setup. A more detailed discussion is given in
[KN00]. Experiments were conducted in computerised laboratories at either Universitat
Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona or at the Universita¨t Mannheim.
We compare two structures, one that we will call ‘circle’, the other we will call ‘group’.
The circle structure represents local interaction, the group structure stands for spaceless
interaction. The structures are shown in figure 2. In each period players interact with
two neighbours to the left (x1, x2) and two neighbours to the right (y1, y2). Hence, in the
group structure everybody has the same interaction partners, in the circle structure the
interaction neighbourhood is different for each member of the population. In our experi-
ment players know that they repeatedly interact for 80 periods with the same neighbours.6
In each round each player has two choices: C or D.7 Payoffs are a function of the player’s
own choice as well as the number of neighbours who chose C. The relation is shown in
table 1.
5See Axelrod [Axe84], Bonnhoeffer, Nowak and May [BMN93], Ellison [Ell93], Eshel, Samuelson, and
Shaked [ESS98], Kirchkamp [Kir00], Lindgren and Nordahl [LN94], Nowak and May [NM92, NM93],
Hegselmann [Heg94], Ely [Ely96].
6The instructions can be found in section C of the appendix.
7A game theorist might argue that we could have obtained more information had we asked participants
only for one repeated game strategy for each repeated game. This argument presupposes that the
submitted repeated game strategies would also explain the players’ actions if the players could choose
stage game strategies on a period to period basis. However, this is only true for perfectly rational players
— and not for real participants of our experiment. One of the results of this paper is that players in the
experiment seem indeed to change their repeated game strategies while playing a single instance of the
repeated game.
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Figure 2: Neighbourhoods
Payoff:
own number of
[
neighbours
group members
]
choosing C
action 0 1 2 3 4
C 0 5 10 15 20
D 4 9 14 19 24
Table 1: Payoff Matrix
5Players also obtain information about payoffs and strategies of their neighbours during
each round. We study two conditions: In one condition players obtain only information
about the average payoff of the two strategies in the last round. We will call this the
“no detailed information” condition. In another condition players know the payoffs of
the underlying game and the actual distribution of payoffs for the two strategies in their
neighbourhood. We will call this the “detailed information” condition. Even in the
information condition information about payoffs of players was ordered by payoffs in each
round. Thus, players only knew how their neighbourhood as a whole performed, they
could not identify patterns in actions or payoffs of particular players nor could they easily
infer actions or payoffs outside their neighbourhood.
In all conditions players were told that they played against the other players in the
room, but that computers were networked randomly so that they never knew the identity
of their neighbours in the game. After the experiment players were payed seperately
and obtained between 5 and 15 Euros for an experiment that lasted for about one hour.
Altogether we did 29 experiments (see section A in the appendix). Instructions to the
experiment can be found in section C in the appendix.
3 A model with constant thresholds
Let us first assume that players follow a simple and constant but individual repeated
game strategy. Players cooperate if and only if the difference between the payoff of the
two strategies C and D in the last ν periods is greater than a certain threshold τν .
8 Given
the payoffs of our game (see table 1) the difference uD − uC between the two strategies,
and, hence, the range of sensible values for τν , lies always between a minimum of −16ν
(D obtains only 4 while C obtains 20) and a maximum of 24ν (D obtains 24 while C gets
only 0).
A player with τν = 24ν always cooperates, a player with τν = 0 always imitates
the strategy with the higher payoff, and a player with τν = −16ν never cooperates.
Intermediate values of τν are possible and yield an intermediate behaviour. Figure 3
illustrates this relationship.
For our experimental data we determine for each player individually the threshold
value τν that maximises the number of correctly explained actions of this player for all 80
periods. If there is no unique such value we take one randomly from the set of maximising
values. We do this separately for time-spans (ν) between 0 and 3. Figure 4 shows the
relation between ν and the relative frequency of correctly explained actions. With ν = 0
predictions assume a very simple strategy, players either always play C or they always
play D. Actually the behaviour of most players (93.01%) is best approximated with all D.
This simple model explains 79.4% of all actions. Introducing information about a single
previous period (ν = 1) increases the number of correctly predicted actions significantly
to 81.5%.9 Introducing more periods (ν = 2 or ν = 3) does no longer improve the number
8The reader should note that this approach weights experience from all past ν periods equally. Alter-
natively one could use discounting of past experience. Our approach seems, however, sufficient to show
that only the recent past (ν = 1) has a substantial impact.
9A Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranksfinds this difference to be significant (z = 5.152, P>|z| =
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Figure 4: Relative frequency of correctly explained actions
7of correctly predicted actions.10 Apparently only the first of the previous periods has a
substantial impact. Introducing more and irrelevant periods deteriorates the quality of
the prediction. We will therefore restrict the analysis in the following to the case ν = 1.
The left part of figure 5 shows the distribution of the threshold level τν under the
assumption that τ is constant for each player. Two things are worth noting: One is that
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Figure 5: Threshold levels and payoffs
the distribution of strategies τν/ν does not seem to depend very much on ν as long as
ν ≥ 1. The second, and more interesting, is that players play D significantly11 more often
than a “switch if better” strategy would recommend. Figure 6 show the distributions for
each condition (circle/groups, detailed information/no detailed information) seperately.
We see that the above finding does not depend on the condition.
Figure 7 shows how players’ behaviour over time becomes increasingly consistent with
this simple model. Some of the remaining unpredicted actions may be explained as
experiments, but others may better be explained through a repeated game strategy that
changes over time. We will therefore allow for changes of repeated game strategies over
time in the next section.
4 Changing Repeated Game Strategies
In our experiment we observe for each player a sequence of actions C or D. This observed
behaviour is consistent with several repeated game strategies. However, a repeated game
strategy that would be consistent with the behaviour of a player for all 80 periods of the
game would be too complex to describe and analyse in a reasonable way. We can possibly
learn more about players’ behaviour if we restrict ourselves to a space of simple repeated
0.0000).
10A Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks finds neither the decrease from ν = 1 to ν = 2 to be significant
(z = −0.476, P>|z| = 0.6341), nor the decrease from ν = 2 to ν = 3 (z = −1.124, P>|z| = 0.2612).
11A Wilcoxon signed-rank test for τ1 = 0 yields z = −3.892 and P>|z| = 0.0001
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Figure 6: Threshold levels, constant for each player, for different conditions
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Figure 7: The number of false predictions decreases over time
9game strategies, such as the one the we have described above in section 3. Having gained
simplicity of strategies we face another problem: Most likely none of our simple strategies
can explain all actions of a player, but for each given period several simple strategies
will be consistent with the action in this period. E.g. if in a given period the difference
uD − uC is 4 and our player plays C then all values of τ ∈ [4, 24] are consistent with
the observed behaviour in this period. To further identify τ we require that τ changes as
little as possible over time. In other words, if there is a τ that explains the behaviour of a
player not only at time t but also at time t− 1 or t + 1 we will favour this τ over another
one that only explains the behaviour at time t.
Here is an example:
Period . . . t− 1 t t + 1 . . .
Action . . . D C D . . .
uD − uC in previous period . . . 9 4 4 . . .
interval of possible τ . . . [−16, 9] [4, 24] [−16, 4] . . .
The example player chooses D in period t− 1. In the previous period uD −uC was 9. We
assume that this player would also play D if uD − uC is larger, but we do not know what
this player would do for smaller values of uD − uC . So far we can restrict the range of
possible values for τ to [−16, 9]. In the next period we see that upon a uD − uC = 4 the
player chooses C. This reduces the range of possible values for τ to [4, 9]. In the following
period τ is restricted to the unique value 4.
In this example only the value τ = 4 explains all observations around t. This, however,
is a lucky coincidence. With our data typically three subsequent periods do not allow to
reduce the range for τ to a single value. We have to take into account more periods to
determine a unique value for τ .
More formally we repeatedly apply the following algorithm:
Be δ(t) the payoff difference uD − uC in period t− 1. Be I0(t) the range of possible τs
that is compatible with a players action in this period:
I0(t) =
{
[δ(t), δmax] if the player plays C in period t
[δmin, δ(t)] if the player plays D in period t
(1)
where δmax and δmin are the maximal and minimal difference of payoffs uD−uC respectively
that can be achived in the experiment. Notice that these intervals are never empty.
We distinguish the following conditions:
a : Ik(t− 1) ∩ Ik(t) ∩ Ik(t + 1) 6= ∅
b : Ik(t− 1) ∩ Ik(t) 6= ∅
c : Ik(t) ∩ Ik(t + 1) 6= ∅
d : min(Ik(t− 1)) > max(Ik(t))
e : max(Ik(t− 1)) < min(Ik(t))
f : min(Ik(t + 1)) > max(Ik(t))
g : max(Ik(t + 1)) < min(Ik(t))
We now iteratively reduce the size of the intervals using the following method:
10
Ik+1 =


Ik(t− 1) ∩ Ik(t) ∩ Ik(t + 1) if a
Ik(t− 1) ∩ Ik(t) if ¬a ∧ b
Ik(t) ∩ Ik(t + 1) if ¬(a ∨ b) ∧ c
max(Ik(t)) if ¬(a ∨ b ∨ c) ∧ d
min(Ik(t)) if ¬(a ∨ b ∨ c ∨ d) ∧ e
max(Ik(t)) if ¬(a ∨ b ∨ c ∨ d ∨ e) ∧ f
min(Ik(t)) if ¬(a ∨ b ∨ c ∨ d ∨ e ∨ f) ∧ g
Ik(t) otherwise
(2)
Before we discuss these conditions in more details, we should note two things:
• Once an interval consists of a singleton it will never change through repeated appli-
cation of the above algorithm.
• Intervals can only become smaller, never larger. Formally ∀j>kIj(t) ⊆ Ik(t). I.e. we
never add something to a strategy of a player, we only make it more precise. The
resulting strategy will always be compatible with what we have observed.
Condition a is the simplest and most frequent case: The ranges for τ in three subsequent
periods are consistent and allow for one or possibly more values of τ . In this case we take
the intersection of these ranges.
If such an intersection would be empty we try to find only two subsequent periods.
We first look more into the past (b) and then more into the future (c).
If this fails as well, then neighbouring ranges for τ do not intersect at all. In our
interpretation this means that we have detected a change in the conditional strategy of
the player. We then assume some inertia and shrink the interval for τt into the direction
of the neighbouring interval. We do this first for t− 1 (conditions d and e) and then for
t + 1 (conditions f and g).
When for all players in the experiment and for all periods Ik+1 = Ik then we have
reached a fixed point of the process. We will call these intervals I∗. Notice that with a
finite number of observations the process always reaches a fixed point in a finite number
of steps.
Will this process converge to only singletons? It is possible to show that if there is some
randomness in players’ behaviour which is not perfectly correlated with the behaviour of
the neighbours then the probability to obtain a unique τ grows arbitrarily close to 1 when
the number of observations per player (number of periods in our experiment) is only large
enough12.
Since we have a finite number of observations in our experiment we only obtain a
unique τ for 99.4% of all players and periods. We dropped the remaining 0.6%.13
Let us start with some summary statistics. Figure 8 shows the development of the
12To see this, one has to show that if Ik(t) is not a singleton then Ik+l(t) will be a singleton if only we
find a t′ such that Ik(t)∩ Ik(t′) is a singleton. In this case l ≤ |t′− t|, i.e. the above process will converge
to a singleton in at most |t′ − t| steps. To ascertain the existence of such a t′ we need the assumptions
of randomness in players’ behaviour together with a large enough number of observations.
13These 0.6% are two players that consistently played D in a surprisingly cooperative neighbourhood.
Instead of dropping these observations we could have replaced these observations with any (constant)
element of the interval of possible τs, without affecting our results.
11
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Figure 8: Threshold level and actual strategies ν
threshold level τ over time in groups and in circles separately, together with the average
level of cooperation. We see that in all conditions the average threshold is lower than the
actual difference uD−uC which is in line with the small amount of cooperation (see figure
1).
We have now calculated for each player a vector of threshold value, one value for each
period. These threshold values are consistent with all actions, and, among all vectors of
threshold values we have selected those where the individual thresholds do not change
much. The next step will be to explain how players choose and change their thresholds.
5 A simple reinforcement model
Reinforcement (see Erev and Roth [ER98]) suggests that players are more likely to switch
to a strategy that was successful in the past. To apply this concept we assume that each
player in each period associates with each experienced value of τ a discounted average
payoff of this strategy.
Applying such a model in a sensible way requires that players collect experience with
several different τs. The left part of figure 9 shows for each period the average number
of different threshold levels players have experienced up to this period, the right part
shows the frequency of changes in τ per period. We see that soon the average player
has experience with at least three different repeated game strategies. This is less than
the maximal number of strategies, but allows us to explain his choices with the help
of comparisons of payoffs. To do that we concentrate on the situation when a player
switches from one repeated game strategy (the ‘source’ strategy) to another (the ‘target’
strategy). The right part of figure 9 shows the frequency of such changes. While there are
more changes at the beginning of the experiment players keep changing strategies until
the end. What are the reasons for these changes?
One hypothesis could be that players choose different strategies based on their past
success with these strategies. To investigate this hypothesis we calculate for each player,
12
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period and for each repeated game strategy the discounted14 payoff while using this strat-
egy up to this period. When a player changes his or her strategy we call δ the difference
between the discounted past payoff of the target strategy and the source strategy. The
relative frequencies of δ are shown in figure 10. The diagram also includes a normal
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Figure 10: Difference between target and source payoff when switching strategies
distribution as a reference.
Notwithstanding the variance of the distribution we see that reinforcement seems to
play a role. Players rather switch to strategies that gave higher payoffs in the past. A
t-test reveals that the mean of δ is significantly positive.15
Although players do not always choose a payoff improving repeated game strategy we
will in the following section assume that they do. How much can we explain with this
simple assumption. To answer this question we determine for each player and period the
14As a discount factor we use 0.9.
15t = 2.56, P>t = 0.008, the test takes into account that observations within a session may be correlated.
13
repeated game strategy with the highest past discounted payoff. This gives us for each
player and period a prediction of a stage game strategy, derived from an endogeneously
determined repeated game strategy. We will call this prediction cˆt.
As an alternative we also calculate the hypothetical behaviour of a player who only
follows a “switch if better” rule as often assumed in the literature.16 This hypothetical
behaviour gives us another prediction that we call c¯t.
We further allow that observed payoffs in the neighbourhood play a role. Similar to cˆt
and c¯t we construct cˆ
n
t and c¯
n
t as predictions based not on own but on average neighbours’
payoff.
Finally we allow for some inertia and introduce yesterday’s action ct−1 as an explana-
tory variable for today’s action ct.
If players’ behaviour would be consistently explained by the “switch if better” learning
rule17 on the level of stage game strategies only c¯t and c¯
n
t should play a role. Both
coefficients should be positive.
Having constructed these variables we run for each condition a probit regression that
explains the actual behaviour ct as a function of c
r
t and c
n
t .
We see that player’s behaviour is not only explained by “switch if better”. The coeffi-
cient of c¯t is positive and always significant. So players certainly follow their own payoffs
in a way that is consistent with “switch if better”. The coefficient c¯nt , however, is not
always positive, and in the detailed information condition not significant. Should we,
therefore, better explain players’ behaviour as governed by a “switch if better” rule that
only takes into account the players’ own payoff and ignores the observed neighbours’ pay-
off? Possibly not, since other variables also contribute significantly to explaining player’s
behaviour. First of all, inertia, modelled as last period’s action, plays an important role
and explains between 15% (circle, no detailed information) and 48% (group, detailed
information) of actions.
Reinforcement of repeated game strategies also has a substantial impact. The coeffi-
cient cˆt is always positive and significant in three out of four conditions where it contributes
between 8% to 10% of actions. Only groups with no detailed information stick out.
The payoff of observed neighbours, however, does not play a great role. The coefficient
cˆnt is not significant in three out of four cases and always has the wrong sign. The
magnitude of the effect is small, however. Between 2% and 4% of the action is affected
by cˆnt .
To summarise, we find that the simple repeated game straegies that we introduced
in section 3 explain a great deal of players’ behaviour. Applying a “switch if better”
rule alone to these strategies, however, explains only part of players’ behaviour. A simple
reinforcement rule also helps us predicting what actions players choose. In both cases pre-
dominantly the players’ own payoff is important. Observed neighbours’ payoff is basically
neglected.
16See footnote 5.
17see footnote 5.
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Probit estimates Number of obs = 3420
Wald chi2(5) = 260.46
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Log likelihood = -1397.9574 Pseudo R2 = 0.1198
(standard errors adjusted for clustering on group_id)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| Robust
c | dF/dx Std. Err. z P>|z| x-bar [ 95% C.I. ]
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
cˆt | .0030687 .0219555 0.14 0.889 .484795 -.039963 .046101
cˆn
t
| -.037927 .0229514 -1.67 0.095 .589181 -.082911 .007057
c¯t | .1303004 .0307688 5.01 0.000 .25614 .069995 .190606
c¯n
t
| .0470498 .0291982 1.72 0.086 .073099 -.010178 .104277
ct−1
(∗) | .3023972 .0367176 11.21 0.000 .17924 .230432 .374362
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
obs. P | .1754386
pred. P | .152746 (at x-bar)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(*) dF/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
z and P>|z| are the test of the underlying coefficient being 0
Probit estimates Number of obs = 3572
Wald chi2(5) = 519.99
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Log likelihood = -1812.997 Pseudo R2 = 0.2027
(standard errors adjusted for clustering on group_id)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| Robust
c | dF/dx Std. Err. z P>|z| x-bar [ 95% C.I. ]
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
cˆt | .1037308 .0292229 3.54 0.000 .573908 .046455 .161007
cˆn
t
| -.027952 .0336965 -0.82 0.411 .631159 -.093996 .038092
c¯t | .0699172 .0337136 2.06 0.040 .3729 .00384 .135995
c¯n
t
| -.0610652 .053192 -1.09 0.275 .088186 -.16532 .043189
ct−1
(∗) | .4787342 .0330236 14.49 0.000 .337626 .414009 .543459
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
obs. P | .3334267
pred. P | .3065019 (at x-bar)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(*) dF/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
z and P>|z| are the test of the underlying coefficient being 0
c
i
r
c
l
e
Probit estimates Number of obs = 6232
Wald chi2(3) = .
Prob > chi2 = .
Log likelihood = -2588.0448 Pseudo R2 = 0.0811
(standard errors adjusted for clustering on group_id)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| Robust
c | dF/dx Std. Err. z P>|z| x-bar [ 95% C.I. ]
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
cˆt | .0820771 .0055242 12.55 0.000 .447288 .07125 .092904
cˆn
t
| -.0263002 .008641 -3.05 0.002 .585286 -.043236 -.009364
c¯t | .1359608 .0291893 5.85 0.000 .269576 .078751 .193171
c¯n
t
| .0618644 .0241181 2.59 0.010 .088254 .014594 .109135
ct−1
(∗) | .1483834 .0073327 29.84 0.000 .167843 .134012 .162755
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
obs. P | .1675225
pred. P | .1500021 (at x-bar)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(*) dF/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
z and P>|z| are the test of the underlying coefficient being 0
Probit estimates Number of obs = 6384
Wald chi2(3) = .
Prob > chi2 = .
Log likelihood = -2952.1436 Pseudo R2 = 0.1567
(standard errors adjusted for clustering on group_id)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| Robust
c | dF/dx Std. Err. z P>|z| x-bar [ 95% C.I. ]
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
cˆt | .0745789 .0335198 2.23 0.026 .500392 .008881 .140277
cˆn
t
| -.0194182 .0299041 -0.65 0.514 .499373 -.078029 .039193
c¯t | .1145471 .0092291 13.27 0.000 .242794 .096459 .132636
c¯n
t
| .0426194 .0274635 1.62 0.105 .119518 -.011208 .096447
ct−1
(∗) | .3781401 .0204581 19.43 0.000 .241071 .338043 .418237
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
obs. P | .2376253
pred. P | .2104257 (at x-bar)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(*) dF/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
z and P>|z| are the test of the underlying coefficient being 0
Table 2: Predicting actions
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6 Conclusion
In the above paper we model players’ repeated game strategies using threshold values for
cooperation.
In a first step we study a model with constant thresholds. Such a model has more
degrees of freedom than a (constant) stage game strategy based model and, hence, can
explain more observations. We find, however, that players’ behaviour can better be ex-
plained when the threshold is allowed to depend on the number of cooperative neighbours
or payoffs.
We then study a simple reinforcement model and find that the repeated game strategies
that we identified and that players experienced to be successful in the past are indeed
more likely to be played. We observe that players change their threshold more rapidly in
a local interaction structure than in a spaceless interaction structure. As a consequence
a decrease of cooperation by neighbours follows an increase of threshold which leads to
less cooperation on the circle than in the groups.
We then explain players’ behaviour with the help of five components. One is iner-
tia, the remaining four are repeated game strategies, driven by own payoff or observed
neighbours’ payoff, either following a “switch if better” strategy or following a simple
reinforcement rule. We find that observed neighbours’ payoff does not contribute much
to a player’s action, neither through a “switch if better” rule nor through a rule that
is selected by reinforcement. We, hence, cast doubt on using imitation as a supporting
element of cooperation in space.18
Player’s own payoff, however, is an important factor in determining behaviour. “Switch
if better”19 certainly plays a role, but is not alone responsible for what a player does. The
role of reinforcement is in the games and structures that we are studying, of about the
same size.
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A List of Experiments
Overview
Number of sessions in different treatments
detailed information no detailed information
group 9 10
circle 5 5
17
Parameters of each session:
structure information
number of
players
1. Group less info 5
2. Group less info 5
3. Group less info 5
4. Group less info 5
5. Group less info 5
6. Group less info 5
7. Group less info 5
8. Group less info 5
9. Group less info 5
10. Group detailed info 5
11. Group detailed info 5
12. Group detailed info 5
13. Group detailed info 5
14. Group detailed info 5
15. Group detailed info 5
16. Group detailed info 5
17. Group detailed info 5
18. Group detailed info 5
19. Group detailed info 5
20. Circle less info 14
21. Circle less info 18
22. Circle less info 18
23. Circle less info 18
24. Circle less info 14
25. Circle detailed info 18
26. Circle detailed info 18
27. Circle detailed info 18
28. Circle detailed info 18
29. Circle detailed info 18
B Raw data
In the following graphs each line represents the actions of a player from period 1 to period
80. Cooperation is shown as l, non cooperation as m. Neighbouring lines correspond to
neighbouring players in the experiment. The last line of each block of lines is in circles
always a neighbour of the first line of the same block. The display of circles is always
rotated such that least cooperative players are found in the first and the last lines.
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B.1 Circle treatment with detailed information
1 20 60 80
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B.2 Group treatment with detailed information
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C Instructions of the Experiment
Please sit down and read the following instructions. It is important that you read them
attentively. A good understanding of the game is a prerequisite of your success.
After having read the instructions you will continue with a little quiz on the computer
screen. There you will be asked questions that will be easy to answer once you have read
the instructions.
You may take notes but you may not talk to each other.
C.1 The structure of the neighbourhood
You y1
y2
y3
y4
y5
y6
y7
y8x9x8
x7
x6
x5
x4
x3
x2
x1 Your gain depends on your decision and on the deci-
sion of your two neighbours to the left and your two
neighbours to the right. These four neighbours re-
main the same during the course of the experiment.
You are connected through the computer with these
neighbours. We will not tell who these neighbours
are. Similarly your neighbours will not be told who
you are.
In the diagram on the right side your four neighbours
are shown cross-hatched.
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You y1
y2
y3
y4
y5
y6
y7
y8x9x8
x7
x6
x5
x4
x3
x2
x1
Also your neighbours have neighbours. E.g. the neigh-
bours of y2 are players y4, y3, y1 and you.
C.2 Rounds
In this experiment you play several rounds. In each round you take a decision. Depending
on your decision and on the decision of your neighbours you receive points that will be
converted to DM at the end of the experiment.
C.3 Decision
In each round you choose among two decisions. You choose A or B. Your gain depends
on what you have chosen and on how many of your neighbours have chosen A or B.
This relation between choices and gains is the same for all participants.
It will be shown on the screen in the form of a table.
Your neighbours play. . .
You play A
You play B . . . Your gain . . .
All players choose simultaneously, without knowing the decision of the others.
When all players have made their decision we continue with the next round.
C.4 Information after each round
In each round your receive information about your gain. Additionally you receive infor-
mation about the decision of your neighbours and their gain.
Round Your Decision Your Gain Decisions and gain in your neig-
bourhood, ordered by gain
. . . . . . . . . . . .
In each row you obtain information about one round. You find your decision and your
gain the second and the third column.
On the right side we show for each of your neighbours the decision of the neighbour
and the obtained gain. The ordering of neighbours in this column depends on the gain
in this period. First comes the neighbour with the highest gain, then the one whose gain
was second, etc.. This implies that in each period a different person can be the first in
the right column.
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C.5 Quiz
Please answer now the questions from the quiz on the computer screen. If you are unsure
how to answer a question, please consult your instructions.
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